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Abstract 
We investigate traders’ behaviour in an experimental asset market where uninformed agents cannot 
be sure about the presence of insiders. In this framework we compare two trading institutions: the 
continuous double auction and the call market. The purpose of this comparison is to test which of 
the two trading mechanisms performs better in disseminating the information and in promoting a 
convergence towards the efficient equilibrium price. Furthermore, we aim to determine which of the 
two trading institutions is more likely to promote a higher level of informational market efficiency. 
In a framework where the presence of insiders is	neither certain nor common knowledge, inspired 
by Plott and Sunder (1982) and Camerer and Weigelt (1991), we first test whether a discrete time 
mechanism of trading, like the call market, might be able to prevent the occurrence of information 
mirages and promote a greater level of efficiency when no inside information is in the market. 
Second, we also compare the efficiency of the two trading institutions during periods when insiders 
are present in the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Experimental Markets, Market Efficiency, Information Mirages, Trading Institutions 
																																								 																				
* Corresponding author: snuzzo1@gmail.com 
2	
	
1. Introduction 
As pointed out by Sunder (1995), asset markets are significantly different from other markets for at 
least two reasons: the informational role of prices and the duality of traders’ behaviour. The first 
feature suggests that prices contain information. This is generally true for any other kind of market, 
but there is a specific issue characterizing asset market prices. While in other markets, prices are 
informative in the sense that they make customers aware of their budget constraints, asset market 
prices reflect the information available to each trader at any instance in time. Strictly speaking, asset 
markets are informative in the sense that they convey information from informed to uninformed 
traders. As Plott (2000) points out, asset markets could be compared to a statistician who collects 
and aggregates the information dispersed across the market, and the asset price is the form in which 
the findings are published. The second feature refers to the fact that each trader could be a buyer as 
well as a seller in the same market, i.e. traders can, both, buy and sell assets in exchange for money. 
We investigate traders’ behaviour in an experimental asset market where uninformed agents 
cannot be sure about the presence of insiders. In this framework we attempt to compare two trading 
institutions: the continuous double auction and the call market. The purpose of this comparison is to 
test which of the two trading mechanisms performs better in disseminating the information and in 
promoting a convergence towards the efficient equilibrium price. In other words, we test which of 
the two trading institutions is more likely to promote a higher level of informational market 
efficiency. 
Several previous studies (see Sunder, 1995) show that the continuous double auction trading 
mechanism succeeds in the complicated task of disseminating the information from informed to 
non-informed traders within contexts where enough traders hold the information and the presence 
of insiders into the market is common knowledge. In this sense, Plott and Sunder (1982) show that, 
for a one period life asset with a common and uncertain value, the double auction mechanism was 
able to drive the price convergence towards the fundamental value of the asset. Differently stated, 
non-informed traders were able to infer information held by informed traders and no relevant 
differences between informed and non-informed traders' profits were found. According to the 
authors, the continuous type of trading involved in the double auction institution may be the main 
factor responsible for the information dissemination. 
Some years later, Camerer and Weigelt (1991) investigated traders’ behaviour in an 
experimental environment where subjects were not sure about the presence of informed traders in a 
given trading period. While in experiments where the presence of insiders is common knowledge, 
the only challenge for non-informed traders is to interpret the information from the insiders’ 
activity, in Camerer and Weigelt’s (1991) framework, traders were not sure whether insiders were 
or were not present during a certain trading period. As a consequence, traders could mistakenly 
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infer information even in cases where no insiders were in the market and prices did not convey any 
information. When one trader incorrectly interprets information during periods with no inside 
information, he may negotiate as if he was an insider. At this point, other traders may wrongly 
conclude that he is an insider and so on. The price path consequently generated is known as the 
"information mirage". Camerer and Weigelt (1991) show that information mirages cause prices to 
depart from the efficient equilibrium price and undermine the overall market efficiency. Inspired by 
the previous two studies, in a framework where the eventual presence of insiders in not common 
knowledge, we first test whether a discrete time form of trading, like the call market, might be able 
to prevent the occurrence of information mirages and promote a greater level of efficiency when no 
inside information has entered the market. Second, we also compare the efficiency of the two 
trading institutions during periods when insiders are within the market. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In the next section we present a review 
of the literature and in the third section the experimental design. In section 4 we discuss the 
theoretical background, then in sections 5 and 6 we present the hypothesis tested and the results 
obtained, respectively. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
As is apparent, the informational role of prices is directly connected with the informational 
efficiency of asset markets. The latter is a key theme in modern finance. Many authors like Fama 
(1965, 1970, 1991, 1998), Samuelson (1965) and Bachelier (1900) have produced several papers 
describing empirical evidence on the statistical properties of prices. According to Fama (1965), a 
market is efficient whenever prices are able to "fully reveal" the available information. In other 
words, informed traders move to take advantage of their information, causing a price change that 
reveals their private information. At the same moment, uninformed traders observing the price 
change can deduce that some informed traders have favourable information about the asset. In a real 
life context, it is really difficult to identify and analytically represent the information set and it is 
also hard to compute the correct theoretical price of a generic asset, which would serve as a 
benchmark for the analysis. Probably the best way to test this theory is in a controlled environment, 
i.e. in an economic laboratory. 
Experimental studies about market efficiency are subdivided into three strands of literature. 
The first is the dissemination of information from informed to uninformed traders. The second 
strand involves studies about the aggregation of information among market participants. The third 
focuses on determining simultaneous equilibrium in asset and information markets. These three 
strands of literature are strongly linked and, when investigating market efficiency, none of these 
strands should be omitted. 
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General details about how to design asset markets can be found in Sunder (1991) and 
Friedman and Sunder (1994). Most experimental designs present a double-auction mechanism in 
which traders are, at any moment, free to post their bid and ask prices and/or accept existing bids 
and asks. This mechanism has the attribute of being symmetric and several studies show its 
appropriateness in reaching the efficient equilibrium (Smith, 1962, 1964, 1976; Plott and Smith, 
1978; Ketcham, Smith and Williams 1984; Holt, Langan and Villamil, 1986; Davis and Williams, 
1986; Smith and Williams, 1989; Gode and Sunder, 1989, 1991; Davids, Harrison and Williams, 
1993; Mestelman and Welland, 1992; Holt, 1995). 
Dissemination of information studies show how information switches from informed to 
uninformed traders. One of the first key papers shedding light on the information dissemination 
topic is by Plott and Sunder (1982). They study the conditions under which information is 
disseminated from informed to uninformed traders. They show that the rational expectations (RE) 
model performs better than the prior information (PI) model in disseminating the pooled 
information in the market. Furthermore, the convergence process accelerates with subjects’ 
experience. Two years later, Forsythe et al. (1984), in a similar framework, confirmed Plott and 
Sunder’s (1982) main results. 
Some years later, Camerer and Weigelt (1991), in an effort to explain the huge amount of 
volatility that sometimes affects asset prices, designed a double auction mechanism where, in each 
period, no traders or half of the traders were insiders. This particular experimental design caused 
uninformed traders to face an additional challenge. If in standard contexts (see Plott and Sunder, 
1982) the only concern for non-informed traders was to try to infer the available information, in this 
new framework traders could not be sure about the presence of insiders within the market. As a 
consequence it might be that, even in periods with no insiders, some agents could mistakenly think 
that there were insiders in the market. Then, these agents could start trading as if they were 
informed, inducing other traders to believe that some information was in the market and so on. This 
mechanism could lead to the creation of a price pattern named "information mirage". The latter 
occurs when traders see information even when no information is within the market. They find that 
mirages are more likely to happen during early periods, because during late periods traders were 
able to infer the presence of insiders by looking at non-price information like the speed of trading. 
Therefore, information mirages in late trading periods were more sporadic.  
Brandouy, Barneto and Leger (2000) provide further evidence about price formation, 
asymmetric information and insider trading influence. They investigate, experimentally, the effects 
of asymmetric and misleading information in a (double-auction) stock market. They find that 
asymmetric information releases its effect into the market only when it has been revealed to all 
market participants. When the presence of informed traders was unknown to the other agents, the 
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inside information allowed insiders to make greater profits, but did not produce any effects in terms 
of informational efficiency.  
Maciejovsky (2001) provides further evidence about information dissemination: with respect 
to the previously presented papers, he also considers the presence of a public signal, accounting for 
the interaction between private and public information. In particular, the paper investigates the 
interaction between differently informed traders within an experimental market. Market participants 
could obtain either a precise public signal, a vague public signal or no public signal. In support of 
the market efficiency theory, the author points out that the initial heterogeneity of information 
among traders tended to disappear over the trading sessions. Public information soon became 
common knowledge as traders submitted their bids and asks and as contracts were concluded. The 
trading profit analysis also confirms this result, evidencing that informed traders were not able to 
make profits higher than average. 
As we have seen, the level of information and the way in which it is disseminated are the 
main responsible factors driving price patterns. Further evidence about dissemination was provided 
by Schnitzlein (2002), who studied order-driven dealer markets where there is uncertainty about the 
number of insiders in the market. Schnitzlein (2002) found that insiders were more likely to 
compete aggressively when the number of insiders was common knowledge with respect to the 
treatment in which there was no disclosure. Moreover, the uncertainty about the actual number of 
insiders causes a convergence towards the fundamental value of the asset to be slower. So, the price 
efficiency is higher when the number of insiders is publicly known. This occurred because, in the 
disclosure treatment, the aggressive competition tended to reveal a lot of information and this 
allowed non-insider subjects to adjust their behaviour. However, in the no disclosure treatment, 
non-informed agents had difficulty making such an inference from insiders. Therefore, the presence 
of insiders and non-informed traders closely affected market participants’ behaviour. In regard to 
this, Grossman (1976) argued that uninformed agents were likely to show imitative behaviours. Hey 
and Morone (2004) provide additional evidence related to imitative behaviour. In their framework, 
traders could buy partially informative signals about the true value of the asset. The authors found 
greater volatility when the reliability of the signal was lower and the cost of the signal was higher. 
Both conditions were responsible for less information and more noise entering the market. In most 
periods, the prices exhibited converged to the real dividend value. Herd behaviour was detected in 
two trading periods. 
Two years later, Koessler, Noussair and Ziegelmeyer (2006) produced extensions of rational 
herd behaviour models, with negative payoff externalities included. In particular, the authors 
theoretically investigated betting behaviour in pari-mutuel markets under the hypothesis of 
asymmetric information. The study demonstrated that the equilibrium properties of simultaneous 
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and sequential markets were significantly different, pointing out that, in equilibrium, the odds 
reflect the private information in the simultaneous case but not necessarily in the sequential case. 
The main factors responsible for causing information inefficiency in sequential markets were 
determined to be herd behaviour, which was associated with high quality information, and 
contrarian behaviour, which was associated with low quality information. 
Huber, Kirchler and Sutter (2008) provide additional experimental evidence about the role 
of privileged information. In an experimental market with agents trading a general security with an 
uncertain value, the paper investigates whether having more information than others is always an 
advantage in terms of final profits. The authors found that there is a wide range of levels of 
information in which having additional information does not provide benefits in terms of higher 
returns. A positive relationship between information and higher profits was detected only for very 
high levels of information.  
Finally, more recent experimental studies about fundamental value trajectories were 
provided by Noussair and Powell (2010), Giusti et al. (2012), Huber et al. (2012), Breaban and 
Noussair (2014), and Noussair and Yilong Xu (2014). As described above, asset markets have a 
tendency to price at levels that are not always consistent with the intrinsic value of the asset. Over 
time, many works focussing on this regularity have been performed (Smith et al. (1988), Caginalp 
et al. (1998, 2000), Lei and Vesely (2009), Lahav and Meer (2010), Lugovskyy et al. (2012), 
Andrade et al. (2012)). One commonly mentioned observation was the suspicion that the declining 
path of the fundamental value could be a source of mispricing. Since securities are finite with a 
maturity date, and pay a dividend at the end of the period, the expected value of future dividends 
decreases as the dividend is paid. Authors such as Noussair (2001) and Kirchler (2012) argue that 
agents trading in a laboratory are not as confident with the declining time patterns of fundamental 
values, because they usually deal with assets in the real world. Consequently, the confusion 
generated by decreasing fundamental patterns could lead to a mispricing phenomenon. The topic 
has been treated differently across the authors. Noussair and Powell (2010) designed an experiment 
with peak and valley phases. Peak phases were characterized by fundamentals increasing in the first 
half of the total periods and decreasing in the second half. Valley sessions occurred in the 
complementing pattern. The authors demonstrate that prices tracked the fundamental value closer 
during a peak than a valley. Giusti et al. (2012) compared experiments in which fundamental values 
either increased or decreased, finding that fundamental value trajectories with an increasing trend 
were more conducive to pricing closer to fundamentals than those that were decreasing. Huber 
(2012) found overpricing and underpricing associated to decreasing and increasing fundamental 
trajectories, respectively. Generally, previous studies showed such a relationship between the 
fundamental value patterns and the price discovery process.  
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Finally, Noussair and Yilong Xu (2014) studied the occurrence of a financial contagion and 
its relationship with information mirages in an experimental asset market. The authors showed that, 
during periods when insiders were present, the private information was rapidly revealed by prices, 
however during periods with no privileged information, information mirages occurred frequently. 
The latter can be easily interpreted as a form of financial contagion, which leads traders to 
mistakenly believe that some information is in the market even during periods without insider 
presence. As a consequence, a market specific shock can be transmitted from one asset to another 
without a justifiable underlying reason. 
Unfortunately, literature is lacking concerning the relationship between trading institutions 
and financial market performance. The continuous double auction and the call auction have been 
the main trading institutions on which most empirical and experimental investigations have been 
performed so far. 
Most of the theoretical research focuses on modelling trading institutions. In regard to call 
auction modelling, the main theoretical contributions can be found in Mendelson (1982), Ho et al. 
(1985), Satterthwaite and Williams (1993), and Rustichini et al. (1994). As far as double auction 
modelling is concerned, the main contributions can be found in Friedman (1984, 1991), Wilson 
(1987), Easley and Ledyard (1993), and Glosten (1994). 
In any case, very few experimental studies have been produced on the relationship between 
trading institutions and market efficiency. Smith et al. (1982) compared the continuous double 
auction with a call market institution. The authors found the price convergence process to be more 
rapid and reliable in the continuous double auction than in the call market. The double auction was 
also found to perform better in terms of allocational efficiency. 
Friedman (1993a) provides another relevant contribution. He studied the impact of both a 
continuous double auction and a clearing house (with multiple orders) trading mechanism on 
market efficiency. He found that the informational efficiency was very similar for the two trading 
institutions compared, however the continuous double auction exhibited greater allocational 
efficiency in respect to the clearing house treatment.  
Theissen (2000) compared continuous double auctions, call markets and dealer markets. The 
author focuses on informational efficiency within a sequentially arriving information framework. 
He found that, in the call market institution, opening prices were closer to the fundamental value of 
the asset than opening prices in the continuous auction and in the dealer markets. Concurrently, the 
call market showed a significant tendency to underreact to the arrival of new information, 
exhibiting a poor ability to relay the new information to prices. The continuous auction and the 
dealer markets were found to be more efficient at the average period price level, in the sense that, 
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on average, these institutions exhibited fewer deviations from the true value of the asset. 
Nevertheless, the dealer market presented the highest transaction costs. 
Van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993) showed that the price bubbles and crashes 
observed in the double auction institution were also found with regularity in a 15-round closed-book 
call market treatment. Trading prices were more likely to track the fundamental value of the asset 
only when the same group of experienced traders participated in three consecutive 15-round 
markets. 
In our experiment we move from the classical framework in which the presence of insiders, 
if there are any, is common knowledge and we investigate the relationship between market 
efficiency and trading institutions in a framework where uninformed traders are unsure about the 
possible presence of insiders. In this new experimental setting, we test which of the two main 
competing trading institutions (the continuous double auction or the call market) performs better in 
promoting a convergence towards the efficient equilibrium price. Our study does not allow testing 
for allocational efficiency, since in our experimental design the security has the same value for each 
holder. Further details about our experimental design are provided in the next paragraph. 
 
3. The experimental design 
We consider six markets where a total of 51 agents trade a generic asset. Each agent is provided 
with 200 units of experimental money and 10 units of a generic asset. At the end of each trading 
period the asset pays out a risky dividend. The value of the dividend could be either 20 or 10, 
depending on two equally likely world states. At the beginning of each trading period, the 
experimenter sets the dividend value that the asset will pay at the end of that trading period by 
flipping a coin. 
The experiment consists of two treatments: In the first treatment trading takes place through 
a continuous double auction trading mechanism (DA), in the second treatment trading is conducted 
through a call market mechanism (CM). The double auction treatment is composed of 4 sessions 
and the call market treatment is composed of 2 sessions. In both treatments, each session consists of 
131 trading periods. In each session, 92 traders are involved. The first trading period of each session 
is a practice period, in which traders are not paid and become aware of the trading mechanism 
functioning. In the double auction treatment, each trading period lasts 5 minutes. In the call market 
treatment, each trading period consists of 4 calls (sub-periods) of 1 minute each. 
																																								 																				
1 Session 2 (DA treatment) was run over 11 trading periods. 
2 Session 2 (DA treatment) and session 1 (CM treatment) were run with 7 and 8 participants respectively. 
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In each period, traders know that there is only a 50% chance that no traders have 
information about the fundamental value of the asset and a 50% chance that only 53 traders out of 9 
are informed about the asset value previously randomly determined by the experimenter. In other 
words, in some periods there will be no information within the market and, in the remaining 
periods, only five traders out of nine will be informed about the value of the dividend.  
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was run at the 
University of Tilburg (CentER). The detailed instructions of the experiment and the zTree screen 
shots can be found in appendixes A and B. 
 
2.1. Earnings 
Earnings were expressed in terms of Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which were converted to 
Euro at the end of the session at a conversion rate of 1 ECU to €0.005 for the double auction 
sessions and 1 ECU to €0.003 for the call market sessions. At the end of each period, both the 
dividend of the period and the profit were announced to traders. At the end of the session, the total 
profit, expressed as the sum of the profits in the 12 real periods, was communicated and paid out to 
each trader. Traders could not sell more units of asset than they owned and could buy shares only if 
they had enough money in their portfolio. In our experiment traders earned, on average, 10 Euros 
per hour.  
 
2.2. State of Information 
At the beginning of each trading period, the software randomly chooses the state and the dividend 
value. The state could be either “Insiders” (I) or “No Insiders” (NI) with a 50% chance. The 
dividend value could be either 10 ECU (Bad State) or 20 ECU (Good State) with a 50% chance. 
Only at the end of each trading period were traders informed about the dividend of the period. 
Before trading started, traders were provided with a signal regarding the information on the 
fundamental value of the asset. The signal could be either “no information on the dividend” or “the 
dividend is 10” or “the dividend is 20”. Traders who received the informative signal (10 or 20) were 
insiders. Traders receiving the non-informative signal did not have any information about the true 
dividend and could not be sure that the randomly chosen state was NI. In fact, in each trading 
period, there existed a 50% chance that all traders received the non-informative signal and a 50% 
chance that only 5 traders out of 9 received the informative signal. The identity of insiders, if there 
were any, was randomly chosen at the beginning of each period and not revealed to the market 
participants. Subjects met in the laboratory and were read the instructions (reported in appendixes A 
																																								 																				
3 Session 2 (DA treatment) and session 1 (CM treatment) were run with 4 insiders, because of the lower number of 
participants with respect to the other sessions. 
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and B). The probabilities of the state, the dividend distribution and the number of insiders (if there 
were any), were common knowledge. 
 
2.4. Trading Institutions 
In a continuous double auction mechanism, each trader, at any moment during the trading period, 
was free to enter a bid (an offer to buy one unit of the asset for a specific amount of cash) or a 
request (an offer to sell one unit of the asset for a specific amount of cash). When a trade proposal is 
submitted, it appears on the book and it becomes public information. Traders can accept outstanding 
bids and asks. When an existing bid or ask is accepted by another trader, then a transaction is 
completed and the price at which the contract has been closed also appears on the book and 
becomes public information. Traders can buy/sell one unit at a time and as often as they wanted in 
each trading period. Plott and Sunder (1982) showed that a double auction trading mechanism 
performs particularly well in disseminating the information, because it involves a continuous type 
of trading. In particular, each subject, while trading, can observe the other traders’ behaviours in the 
market. This feature allows uninformed traders to infer the information held by informed traders 
just by observing their trading activity. If the inference process is complete and immediate, actual 
prices should reveal at any moment all the aggregate information in the market. However, in a call 
market (call auction) mechanism, each trader privately submits his purchase or sale order. For a 
single unit of the asset, the purchase order consists of the highest acceptable purchase price and the 
sale order represents the lowest acceptable sale price. When the trading (sub) period closes, all the 
orders previously submitted are collected and processed. In particular, purchase orders are ordered 
from the highest to the lowest and the demand function is derived. Sale orders are ordered from the 
lowest to the highest and the supply function is derived. The intersection point of the demand and 
supply function determines the clearing price at which the orders will be executed. Nevertheless, 
there is no guarantee that all the submitted orders will be executed. In particular, only the purchase 
orders at a price equal to or above the clearing value and only the sale orders at a price equal to or 
below the equilibrium value will be executed. Then, the clearing system provides the market with a 
uniform price for each call. Typically, there could be more than one call per period. In our 
experiment there are four calls in each trading period. In this kind of trading mechanism, each 
trader, when submitting his proposal, cannot observe whether the other market participants are 
operating as sellers or buyers and at which price they would like to sell or buy the asset. Only at the 
end of each trading (sub) period does each trader observe the demand and supply functions and the 
clearing price, realizing whether or not his proposal was executed. Therefore, in a call auction 
system, a discrete type of time trading takes place. 
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In our particular framework, in the call market sessions, traders had the chance to choose 
among three options: buying, selling or no-trading. If traders decided to be buyers (sellers) they 
were asked to submit the price at which they would like to buy (sell) the asset and how many units 
they would like to buy (sell) at that price. The state and the signal remained the same in the 4 sub-
periods of each period. Only at the end of each period was the dividend revealed to the market 
participants. 
In the determination of the equilibrium price (clearing price), some particular cases can arise 
in the call market mechanism. In fact, traders’ orders can lead to situations in which there is an 
overlap of either suitable quantities or prices. In other words, it may be that a horizontal segment of 
the aggregate demand curve intersects with a horizontal segment of the aggregate supply curve. In 
this case, there is an overlapping of quantities. Similarly, it may be that a vertical segment of the 
aggregate demand curve intersects with a vertical segment of the aggregate supply curve. In this 
case, there is an overlapping of prices. To explain how, in equilibrium, price and quantity are 
determined in these special cases, first we report an example of quantities overlapping. Suppose that 
6 subjects are trading in the market and that three of them are buyers and the other three are sellers. 
Among the buyers, the first subject (subject 1) would like to buy 2 units at 17 ECU, the second 
subject (subject 2) desires to buy 3 units at 15 ECU and the third subject (subject 3) wants to buy 2 
units at 13 ECU. Among sellers, the first subject (subject 4) would like to sell 2 units at 11 ECU, 
the second subject (subject 5) desires to sell 2 units at 15 ECU and the third subject (subject 6) 
wants to buy 3 units at 16 ECU. The buyer and seller orders are summarized in table 1; the demand 
and supply functions are drawn as in figure 1. 
      Demand side Supply side 
Buyer Price Quantity Seller Price Quantity 
Subject 1 17 2 Subject 4 11 2 
Subject 2 15 3 Subject 5 15 2 
Subject 3 13 2 Subject 6 16 3 
Table 1  
 
As we can see in figure 1, quantities overlap in the range from 2 to 4 units. The equilibrium 
price is 15 ECU, where the demand and supply functions intersect. In this case, quantities are split 
in the following way: the first buyer (subject 1) who offered to buy 2 units at 17 ECU will buy 2 
units at 15 ECU, the second buyer (subject 2) who offered to buy 3 units at 15 ECU will buy only 2 
units at 15 ECU. Subject 2 was not able to additionally buy the third unit because there were only 
two units left at a price equal or below 15 ECU. The third buyer (subject 3) who offered to buy 2 
units at 13 ECU bought no units because there were no units left at a price equal to or below 13 
ECU. Similarly, the first seller (subject 4) who asked to sell 2 units at 11 ECU, sold 2 units at 15 
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ECU. The second seller (subject 5) who asked to sell 2 units at 15 ECU, sold 2 units at 15 ECU. 
The third seller (subject 6) who asked to sell 3 units at 16 ECU did not buy anything because there 
were no units left at a price equal to or above 16 ECU. 
 
Figure 1 
Second, we report an example where prices overlap. Suppose that 4 subjects are trading in 
the market and that two of them are buyers and the other two are sellers. Among buyers, the first 
subject (subject 1) would like to buy 2 units at 15 ECU and the second subject (subject 2) desires to 
buy 2 units at 14 ECU. Among sellers, the first subject (subject 3) would like to sell 2 units at 10 
ECU and the second subject (subject 4) desires to sell 2 units at 17 ECU. 
      Demand side Supply side 
Buyer Price Quantity Seller Price Quantity 
Subject 1 15 2 Subject 3 10 2 
Subject 2 14 2 Subject 4 17 2 
Table 2 
 
Figure 2 
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The buyer and seller orders are summarized in table 2; the demand and supply functions are 
illustrated in figure 2. As we can see in figure 2, suitable prices overlap the range 14 to 15 ECU. 
The equilibrium quantity is unique and equal to 2 units. By definition, a competitive equilibrium 
occurs at any price that equates the offered and demanded quantities. In this special case, the 
demand and supply functions intersect along the vertical segment between 14 and 15. As a 
consequence, any point on this vertical line is potentially a competitive price, which leads to the 
same welfare. For concreteness, in cases with no-unique price solution, we compute the equilibrium 
price as the mid-point of all the possible competitive prices. So, in this particular case, the 
competitive price is assumed to be 14.5, which is the midpoint between 14 and 15. In particular, the 
first buyer (subject 1), who offered to buy 2 units at 15 ECU, bought 2 units at 14.5 ECU and the 
first seller (subject 3), who asked to sell 2 units at 10 ECU, sold 2 units at 14.5 ECU. Both the 
second buyer (subject 2) and the second seller (subject 4) did not buy anything because their 
proposals were respectively below and above the equilibrium price. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
There are two main competing models that can be applied to our data. The first is the prior 
information (Walrasian) model and the second is the rational expectations model.  
The prior information model has been the traditional way to study how information is 
incorporated into actual prices. It states that, under expected utility and risk neutrality assumptions, 
traders’ expectations on future prices are exogenous to the price formation mechanism. Strictly 
speaking, traders form their price expectations relying only on prior information (i.e. the dividend 
distribution), and they never update their a priori information during the trading period.  
The rational expectations model states that traders’ expectations on future prices are 
endogenous to the price formation process. Differently stated, traders continuously condition their 
private a priori information on actual prices. According to this model, uninformed traders are able 
to infer the realized state from market prices. In this sense, prices always fully reveal the aggregate 
information available in the market. As a consequence, there are no under-valued or over-valued 
securities in the market and the information is promptly revealed from informed to non-informed 
traders. Since the inside information can at any moment be fully revealed, there is no longer any 
advantage in being an informed trader and, at the end of the trading period, we should expect 
informed and non-informed traders’ profits to be indistinguishable. 
These two models will be applied to our data to see which of them is the best predictor of 
price patterns. The methodology of our analysis will be explained in detail in the next paragraph. 
In terms of price predictions, the crucial difference between the two models can occur when 
the expected value of the asset is higher than the dividend associated to the realized state. In terms 
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of security holdings, the two models’ predictions are different independent of the realized state. 
When the good state is the realized one, according to the prior information model, informed traders 
are expected to be willing to bid more than uninformed traders who only evaluate the asset at its 
expected value (which is lower than the good state dividend). Then, only informed traders will 
manage to buy the asset and the price is expected to converge, at most, to the high dividend. Note 
the high dividend price is only the highest value in the possible equilibrium price range consistent 
with the model. The high dividend price will be attained only if informed traders have enough cash 
to bid up the prices. If not enough liquidity reaches buyers’ hands and if sellers aggressively 
compete to sell out the asset, then insiders will be able to buy at prices even below the high 
dividend value (20). Then, the price range consistent with the model depends on the market 
liquidity and on the demand and supply conditions. For sure, the high dividend will be the upper 
bound of this range. 
According to the rational expectations model, as prices are fully revealing, uninformed 
traders will behave as if they were insiders. Then, the price will converge to the high dividend but, 
in contrast to the prior information prediction, both informed and uninformed traders will hold the 
asset. Now suppose that the bad state is the realized one. In this case, the expected dividend is 
higher than the dividend associated with the realized state. If the prior information model holds, 
uninformed traders evaluate the asset more than informed traders and, as a consequence, only 
uninformed traders will manage to buy the asset and the price is expected to converge at most to the 
expected dividend. Also in this case, the expected dividend is only the upper bound of the possible 
equilibrium price range. Then, if not enough cash has reached buyers’ hands and if sellers 
aggressively compete to sell the security, it is likely that uninformed traders will manage to buy at 
prices even below the expected dividend, having never attained the upper bound. However, if the 
rational expectations model holds, uninformed traders infer the realized state and will no longer be 
willing to pay as much as the expected dividend. Then the price will converge to the bad state 
dividend and both uninformed and informed traders will hold the asset at the end of the trading 
period. 
 
4. The Methodology of the Analysis 
The crucial issue of our research is that insider presence in the market is not common knowledge. 
Strictly speaking, uninformed traders cannot be sure whether or not there are informed agents in the 
market. Then, in our analysis we need to distinguish between periods with and without inside 
information. Taking into account the two competing models introduced in the previous paragraph 
(i.e. the prior information model, and the rational expectations model), we now perform a closer 
investigation on what to expect in our specific framework. In particular, we analyse the models’ 
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predictions in terms of equilibrium price and security holdings. Starting from periods with inside 
information, a summary of the models’ predictions is reported in table 3: 
	 	 	  Good state, p=0.5 Bad state, p=0.5 
 
20 10 
RE eq. price 20 10 
RE asset holder Type 1 Type 1 
Type 2 Type 2 
PI eq. Price 20 (at most) 15 (at most) 
PI asset holder Type 1 Type 2 
Table 3: RE and PI predictions in periods with inside information 
 
Both, good and bad states could occur with equal probability. The dividends associated with the 
good and bad state are 20 and 10 respectively; thus the expected dividend is 15 (also called the 
uninformed price). Let us denote informed traders as “type 1” and uninformed traders as “type 2”. 
In particular, type 1 traders are those who knew the dividend value at the beginning of the period 
and type 2 traders are those who did not have any information on the fundamental value of the asset 
when trading started. 
Suppose the good state is the realized one. If the prior information equilibrium holds, 
informed traders (type 1) will evaluate the asset at 20 at most, while uninformed traders (type 2) 
will evaluate the asset at 15. Then, only type 1 traders are expected to manage to buy and hold the 
asset at the end of the period and the price is predicted to converge at most to 20. Note that 20 is 
only the upper bound of the equilibrium price range consistent with the model. However, it is not 
certain that the high dividend equilibrium price will be attained. For instance, if insiders do not have 
enough cash to bid up the prices or if sellers compete aggressively to sell the security, it may occur 
that insiders will be able to buy even at prices below the high dividend value. If the rational 
expectations equilibrium holds, uninformed traders (type 2) are expected to infer the realized state 
and to start trading as if they were fully informed. Then the price should converge to 20 and both 
type 1 and type 2 traders will hold the asset at the end of the period. 
Now suppose that the bad state is the realized one. If the prior information model holds, 
uninformed traders (type 2) will evaluate the security more than informed traders (type 1). Then the 
price is expected to converge at most to 15 and type 2 traders are supposed to hold the security at 
the end of the period. Also in this case, 15 is only the highest value in the equilibrium price range 
consistent with the model. Then, there is no guarantee that the expected dividend value will be 
attained. If non-informed agents do not have enough liquidity to bid up the prices or if insiders 
strongly compete to sell out the asset, then uninformed agents might be able to buy the security 
even at prices below the expected dividend value. However, if the rational expectations model 
holds, uninformed traders (type 2) will be able to learn that the asset will only pay out 10 at the end 
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of the period. Then, the price is expected to converge to 10 and both types 1 and 2 traders are 
supposed to hold the security at the end of the period. 
As far as periods without insiders having information are concerned, the rational 
expectations and the prior information models lead to the same equilibrium prediction. The 
equilibrium price is expected to be 15, without any distinction about the type of traders holding the 
asset. The reason for this is straightforward: there is just no information to be disseminated and 
traders are expected to rely only on their prior probabilities (assuming risk neutrality and expected 
utility). 
Taking into consideration these model predictions in our particular framework, we build up 
our set of hypotheses. In the first step of our analysis, we investigate whether information mirages 
are more likely to occur in the double auction rather than in the call market treatment. An 
information mirage can potentially occur in periods without insiders if non-informed traders 
mistakenly believe that there is some information in the market. In periods with no insiders, the 
rational expectations and the prior information predictions coincide and both of them state that the 
actual prices should converge to the uninformed price, which is equal to the expected value of the 
dividend distribution. Then, if the market is efficient, during periods without insiders we should 
observe prices fluctuating around 15, which is the uninformed price. But if an information mirage 
occurs, we can observe prices converging to the wrong value, which can be either 10 (bad state 
dividend), or 20 (good state dividend) or, more generally, any other value different from the 
expected dividend. 
We now formulate our first hypothesis and its alternative hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Information mirages are equally likely to occur independent of the 
trading institution through which trading is conducted. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1a: Information mirages are more likely to occur when trading 
takes place through a double auction institution. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1b: Information mirages are more likely to occur when trading 
takes place through a call market institution. 
In order to detect an information mirage we use a very stringent methodology, which requires three 
conditions. First, we look at periods without insiders. Second, we require the median actual price to 
be closer to the mirage price (10 or 20) than to the RE/PI prediction price. Third, the mean squared 
error (MSE) between the actual prices and the mirage price has to be lower than the MSE between 
the actual prices and the RE/PI prediction price. The MSE is used as a measure of deviation of 
actual prices from the RE/PI predictions. The formulation is reported below: 
MSE = 1n PE -Pi( )
2
i=1
n
∑  
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where: 
EP  represents the theoretical equilibrium value according to the RE/PI predictions, 
iP  represents the actual prices. 
Generally speaking, the MSE measures the average squared deviation of trade prices over the 
theoretical equilibrium value. The lower the MSE is, the more the market is trading in proximity of 
the RE/PI prediction. Then, the third condition requires that actual prices exhibit less deviation from 
the mirage price than from the uninformed price. 
In the second step of our analysis, we test the informational market efficiency. Strictly 
speaking, we test how much closer the actual prices time series is with respect to the RE/PI 
predictions. In this step, we distinguish between periods with no inside information in the market 
and periods with informed insiders. As stated above, the reason for this distinction is that the RE/PI 
predictions are different depending on the presence of insiders in the market. 
Then, we formulate our second hypothesis and its alternative hypotheses. Our second 
hypothesis is divided into hypothesis 2a and 2b. 
Hypothesis 2a: During periods with no inside information, prices exhibit the same 
deviation from the rational expectations predictions when trading takes place through the 
call market and the double auction mechanism. 
Alternative Hypothesis 2a(i): During periods with no inside information, prices exhibit 
closer convergence to the rational expectations predictions when trading takes place 
through the call market mechanism. 
Alternative Hypothesis 2a(ii): During periods with no inside information, prices exhibit 
closer convergence to the rational expectations predictions when trading takes place 
through the double auction mechanism.  
Hypothesis 2a is strictly linked with hypothesis 1. In fact, if we find that information mirages are 
more likely to occur in the double auction treatment, we should also expect alternative hypothesis 
2a(i) to be accepted. Indeed, information mirages undermine the overall efficiency of the market, 
causing prices to depart from the efficient equilibrium price. So, if we find that the call market 
institution is more likely to prevent the occurrence of information mirages, then we should also 
expect the call market mechanism to perform better when no inside information is within the 
market. 
Hypothesis 2b: During periods when insiders have information, prices exhibit the same 
deviation from the rational expectations predictions when trading takes place through the 
call market and the double auction mechanism. 
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Alternative Hypothesis 2b(i): During periods when insiders have information, prices 
exhibit closer convergence to the rational expectations predictions when trading takes 
place through the double auction mechanism.  
Alternative Hypothesis 2b(ii): During periods when insiders have information, prices 
exhibit closer convergence to the rational expectations predictions when trading takes 
place through the call market mechanism. 
In order to test hypothesis 2, we compute the mean squared error (MSE) of actual prices versus the 
RE/PI price predictions. In a given trading period, if the actual prices’ MSE tendency toward the RE 
prediction is lower than the MSE computed tendency toward the PI prediction, then this indicates 
that prices more closely track the RE prediction price than the PI one. It has to be pointed out that, 
when the good state occurred, the RE and the PI price forecasts are not so different from each other. 
In fact, the RE model predicts a convergence toward 20 and the PI model predicts that prices can 
converge at most to 20, depending on the market liquidity and on the demand/supply conditions. 
So, if the good state occurs and we detect a price convergence toward 20, we cannot definitely state 
which of the two equilibria is being achieved. In this case, to state whether the RE or the PI model 
is holding, we investigate the RE and PI security holdings predictions. More details on this 
procedure will be reported in the next paragraph. 
In the third step of our analysis we investigate how profits are distributed between informed and 
uninformed traders. This step is useful for further investigation of information dissemination during 
the insider state. In fact, when there are insiders within the market, if the information is promptly 
disseminated, one should expect insiders’ and non-insiders’ profits to be indistinguishable at the 
end of the period. In other words, if uninformed traders soon discover the realized state, they are 
expected to trade as they were informed, eliminating the informational advantage of informed 
traders. The sooner the information is disseminated, the sooner the insiders informational advantage 
diminishes. If the information dissemination occurs only in late periods, then informed traders have 
the possibility to exploit their informational advantage in the early moments of the trading period, 
making higher profits than uninformed traders. So, not only does it matter whether or not the 
information is disseminated but also the timing of the dissemination process is significant for profits 
accountability. 
To test how profits are distributed between insiders and non-informed agents, we compute, 
within each period with inside information, the percentage ratio of the average realized profit per 
informed trader to the average realized profit per uninformed trader. We call this measure “insider 
premium”. In a given period, if the insider premium approximates 100%, it would mean that, on 
average, informed and non-informed traders realized the same profit. Differently stated, it would 
mean that the dissemination was sufficiently rapid to allow uninformed traders to recover their 
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informational disadvantage and to perform, on average, as well as the informed agents. Then we 
formulate our third hypothesis and its alternative hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3: During periods when inside information, there are no significant 
differences between the double auction and the call market insider premium.  
Alternative Hypothesis 3a: During periods when insiders have information, the double 
auction insider premium is higher than the call market insider premium. 
Alternative Hypothesis 3b: During periods when insiders have information, the call 
market insider premium is higher than the double auction insider premium. 
In the next paragraph we report our experimental results for each of the three previously stated 
hypotheses. 
 
5. Experimental Results 
Looking for informational mirage we can report our first result: we reject hypothesis 1 and we 
accept alternative hypothesis 1a, i.e. information mirages are more likely to occur when trading 
takes place through a double auction mechanism. As mentioned in the last paragraph, first we look 
for information mirages during the no insider periods. Then, we require the median actual price to 
be closer to the mirage price (10 or 20) than to the RE/PI price, and the mean squared error (MSE) 
between the actual prices and the mirage price to be lower than the MSE between the actual prices 
and the RE/PI price. Figure 3 illustrates situations where we detect information mirages in the 
double auction treatment. 
5
10
15
20
25
No Insiders Periods (DA Treatment)
Median Trading Prices
No Mirage Mirage (10) Mirage (20)
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Median Actual Prices during periods with no inside information (DA),  
grouped by type of mirage 
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In the double auction treatment, we detect 9 mirages out of 20 periods without inside 
information4. Out of the 9 mirages detected, 3 reflected the good state price and 6 reflected the bad 
state price.  
In the call market treatment, we detect 2 mirages out of 9 periods with no inside information 
(see figure 4). Both mirages reflected the good state price (20). 
Then, considering both treatments, out of the 11 mirages detected, 6 reflected the bad state 
price (10) and 5 reflected the good state price (20). So, mirages did not exhibit a remarkable 
tendency to reflect the good state price rather than the bad state price5. 
 
5
10
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No Insiders Periods (CM Treatment)
Median Trading Prices
No Mirage Mirage (20)
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Median Actual Prices in periods with no inside information (CM), 
grouped by type of mirage 
 
We now concentrate on informational efficiency. We reject hypothesis 2a and we accept 
alternative hypothesis 2a(i). During periods with no insider information in the market, prices 
exhibited a closer convergence to the RE equilibrium when trading took place through a call market 
mechanism. Since information mirages are more likely to occur in the double auction treatment, our 
result about hypothesis 2a is not surprising. Since, the call market mechanism is more likely to 
prevent information mirages from occurring, we should also expect the call market to promote a 
greater level of informational efficiency when no insiders are present in the market. Remembering 
																																								 																				
4 We exclude 4 periods that, even satisfying our three conditions, exhibited a trading activity, which did not resemble 
the typical activity during insider periods. In particular, we exclude period 12 of session 1 and periods 4, 5 and 7 of 
session 4. The trading activity in these periods is illustrated in appendix C. Looking at the activity in periods 12, 4 and 
5, we see that for the most of the period prices are closer to a potential mirage price and that the convergence towards 
the expected dividend only occurs in the late moments of the period. In period 7, even in the final part of the period, 
prices fluctuated over a range between 10 and 15. In this case, we think that a great level of risk aversion may be 
responsible for this price pattern. 
5 Trading activity in all the periods in which we detect information mirages is reported in appendix D. 
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that the market is efficient if prices fluctuate around the expected dividend (uninformed price), but 
not during insider periods. Then, to classify the market as efficient, we require trading prices to 
exhibit a lower MSE when compared with the uninformed price than when compared with both the 
good (20) and bad (10) state prices. The clearest way to show this kind of result is to count, period 
by period (only when no insiders are in the market), how many times the MSE to the expected 
dividend (15) is lower than both the MSE to the low dividend (10) and the MSE to the high dividend 
(20). Performing this analysis, we find that, in the double auction treatment, in 7 out of 20 (35% of 
the cases) periods with no insiders, the MSE to the uninformed price is lowest when it is compared 
to, both, the low and the high dividend. Note that it is not obvious when a non-mirage situation 
coincides with a situation where the market is efficient in the sense described above. For example, 
period 12 of session 3 has not been classified as a mirage, even though the MSE to the low dividend 
was the lowest, since the median price was 16 and it was closer to the uninformed price than to any 
other possible dividend. Therefore, one of our three conditions was missing. In any case, even if no 
mirage occurred during this period, the market cannot be said to be efficient because the MSE value 
to the expected dividend was higher than the MSE to the low dividend. Apart from period 12 of 
session 3, in all other non-insider periods, a non-mirage always coincides with a situation in which 
the efficient price was attained. Similarly, in the call market treatment, in 7 periods out of 9 (77% of 
the cases) with no insiders in the market, the MSE value to the uninformed price was lower than 
both the MSE to the low and the high dividend. So, we find the call market mechanism to be more 
efficient than the double auction one when there is no information in the market. As a further step, 
during all non-insider periods in which the uninformed price is the best approached benchmark, we 
compare the double auction MSE distribution with the call market one. This further test is useful to 
identify in which of the two treatments the rational expectations price was approached with a lesser 
margin of error. Figure 5 shows the box plot analysis of the MSE distribution in the two treatments. 
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Figure 5: MSE Distribution 
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As we can see, there is a remarkable shift between the two distributions. In particular, there 
is no overlap between the boxes, with the call market MSE distribution lower than the double 
auction MSE distribution. This suggests that, when no information was in the market, actual prices 
tracked the efficient equilibrium price more accurately in the call market treatment than in the 
double auction one6. 
Therefore, it is possible to state that, when trading takes place through the call market 
mechanism and there are no insiders in the market, actual prices track the rational expectations price 
prediction much better than when trading occurs through a double auction institution. We can 
conclude that, from testing hypothesis 2a, without information in the market, in the clearing 
mechanism prices converge to the RE prediction in 77% of the periods contrasted against 35% of 
the cases of the double auction treatment. We also conclude that, when the convergence towards the 
RE prediction occurred, actual prices exhibited, on average, smaller deviations from the equilibrium 
value when trading was conducted through the call market mechanism. Differently stated, in the call 
market treatment, the benchmark tracking was closer than in the double auction one. 
Furthermore, in periods with no inside information, we find that prices exhibited lower volatility 
when trading took place by means of a clearing mechanism. Excluding insider periods, the average 
price volatility over the four double auction sessions was 1.86, against an average volatility of 0.44 
computed over the two call market sessions. This suggests that, excluding insider periods, the call 
market also performed very well in reducing noise and in stabilizing trading prices. This feature will 
be relevant for our policy implications.  
As far as hypothesis 2b is concerned, we test which of the two market institutions performs 
better in disseminating information when insiders are present in the market. Recalling that, when 
the realized state is the bad one (dividend 10), the RE prediction price is 10 and the PI predicts a 
convergence of 15 maximum. However, when the realized state is good (dividend 20) the RE 
prediction is 20 and the PI predicts a convergence of 20 maximum. So, when the bad state occurs, 
testing for informational efficiency is straightforward, but when the good state occurs it is not 
obvious. Since, when the good state occurs and prices converge to 20, we cannot be sure which 
model prediction has been achieved. Then, when the good state occurs, we also look at security 
holdings to assess whether the convergence occurs toward the RE or the PI prediction. In particular, 
the PI model predicts that uninformed traders should be willing to pay, at most, as much as the 
expected value of the asset (15). Otherwise, informed traders, since they know in advance the 
realized state, should be willing to pay, at most, 20 to buy the asset. In so doing, and in accordance 
with the PI model, only informed traders are supposed to hold the security at the end of the trading 
																																								 																				
6 This result is quantitatively confirmed by the two-sample Kolmogrov-Smirov test, see Box 1 in Appendix F. 
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period. In contrast, the RE model predicts that uninformed traders should be able to infer the 
realized state and so they should be willing to pay, at most, 20 to buy the security as well. As a 
consequence, if we detect convergence toward the good state price with only informed traders 
holding the asset at the end of the period, then we can be sure that the PI model was attained. 
Similarly, if we detect convergence toward the good state price with both informed and uninformed 
traders holding the asset at the end of the period, then it suggests that the RE prediction was 
reached. 
In the double auction treatment, out of 16 periods where the bad state (10) occurred, in 12 of 
those periods prices converged toward the RE prediction price, which is 10. In the call market 
treatment, out of 5 periods where the bad state (10) was realized, in 2 of those periods prices 
converged toward the RE prediction price (10). So, in the double auction treatment, the 
convergence to the RE prediction occurred in 75% of the cases, in contrast to 40% of the cases in 
which the RE prediction was attained in the call market treatment. 
In the double auction treatment, out of 10 periods where the good state value (20) occurred, 
in 7 of those periods trading prices exhibited convergence toward the RE/PI equilibrium price. In 
the call market treatment, convergence toward the RE/PI equilibrium took place in 5 out of 10 
periods where the good state occurred. In both treatments, none of the periods ended with only 
informed traders holding the security. Then, we cannot conclude that the PI equilibrium was 
attained in both treatments. Nevertheless, we find significant differences in holding securities 
between the double auction and the call market treatment7. We can now state that, on average, 
uninformed traders held 19.36% of the total shares in the call market and 35.82% in the double 
auction treatment. Then, on average, in the double auction treatment, uninformed traders held 
16.46% more of the total shares with respect to the call market treatment8.  
This result suggests that uninformed traders in the call market were less able to infer the 
inside information. However, when trading took place through a double auction mechanism, the 
inside information was more promptly disseminated and uninformed traders were better able to 
learn the realized state. This result is corroborated by the observation that, in the double auction 
treatment, uninformed traders never ended up with no shares. Additionally, in the call market 
treatment, in all periods where prices converged to 20 (good state), at least one uninformed trader 
ended up with no shares. This may be due to the fact that, in the double auction institution, the 
continuous type of trading and the real time updating of bids and asks promoted a more qualitative 
information dissemination. 
																																								 																				
7 See Box 2 in appendix F. 
8 This difference is also statistically significant. We can accept the hypothesis that, in the call market, the mean of the 
distribution of the non-insiders’ percentage of shares is lower than in the double auction with a p-value of 0.29. 
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In conclusion, we reject hypothesis 2b and we accept alternative hypothesis 2b(i). In both 
the bad and good states, the double auction mechanism performed quantitatively and qualitatively 
better in disseminating the inside information. The trading activity during the insider periods is 
reported in appendix E. 
Now we move on to the profit analysis. As said above, when the information is promptly 
disseminated into the market, we should expect uninformed and informed traders’ profits to be 
indistinguishable. That is because, as the information is disseminated, it soon becomes common 
knowledge and not only insiders but also uninformed agents can act on it, since they knew in 
advance the realized state. It has also been said that the measure in which insiders and non-insiders’ 
profits are indistinguishable crucially depends on the timing through which the information 
dissemination occurs. On one hand, if complete dissemination occurs only when the market is about 
to close, then informed agents have enough time to exploit their informational advantage and, 
consequently, to realize higher profits than uninformed agents. On the other hand, if the information 
dissemination occurs just after the market opens, then uninformed traders have a lot of time to 
behave as if they were fully informed. As a consequence, insiders’ informative advantage soon 
disappears and, at the end of the trading period, insiders’ and non-insiders’ profits should only 
differ insignificantly. 
In our specific framework, focusing on all the inside periods in which prices exhibited 
convergence toward the rational prediction price expectations, we investigate which trading 
institution is more likely to promote a sufficiently rapid dissemination so as to cause uninformed 
and informed agents’ profits to be indistinguishable. In order to address this point, we compute the 
percentage ratio of the average realized profit ‘per insider’ to the average realize profit ‘per 
uninformed’ trader. We call this measure “insider premium”. The more this premium approaches 
100%, the more uninformed and informed traders’ profits are indistinguishable and the more the 
information has been promptly and quickly disseminated. 
Based on the insiders’ premium, we find that the median premium in the double auction 
treatment was 104.23% against a call market treatment median premium of 106.17%. Therefore, the 
median premium in the double auction treatment is almost 2 percentage points lower than the 
median premium in the call market treatment. 
This result suggests that, when some inside information was present in the market, it more 
rapidly disseminated in the double auction treatment, and this caused uninformed and informed 
traders’ profits to be more similar with respect to the call market treatment. This result is not 
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statistically significant9, i.e. the two distributions cannot be said to come from populations with 
different medians. Then, we accept hypothesis 3.  
 
6. Conclusion, discussion and policy implications 
There is an ongoing debate over the relationship between market efficiency and trading institutions. 
Our study focuses on comparing two trading institutions, the continuous double auction and the call 
market, in a framework in which uninformed traders are unsure about the presence of insiders in the 
market. Strictly speaking, the presence of informed agents in the market was not common 
knowledge. In this environment, even when no inside information is in the market, for some reason, 
uninformed agents may mistakenly believe that some insiders are trading in the market. This 
mistake could generate an “information mirage”, that is, a price pattern in which actual prices 
depart from the efficient equilibrium price. 
Our results show that information mirages are more likely to occur when trading takes place 
through a double auction mechanism.  
Furthermore, in periods with no inside information, the call market mechanism performed 
significantly better in causing trading prices to converge to the efficient equilibrium price than the 
double auction one. Moreover, when considering all non-insider periods in which the convergence 
toward the RE prediction occurred, actual prices exhibited, on average, smaller deviations from the 
efficient equilibrium price when trading was conducted through the call market mechanism. Then, 
the call market promoted a more qualitative benchmark tracking with respect to the double auction 
mechanism. 
However, when inside information was present in the market, the double auction mechanism 
performed better in disseminating the available information than the call market mechanism. It is 
probable that the prominent characteristics of the double auction mechanism (such as the 
continuous type of trading, the absence of limits to the number of traders’ proposals, the public 
sharing of the agents’ proposals as they are submitted and the continuous update of the book) are 
responsible for promoting the information dissemination when insiders are in the market. However, 
when they are not present, and traders mistakenly believe the opposite, the double auction 
mechanism is more likely to disseminate information that does not exist, causing information 
mirages. Similarly, the main distinctive features of the call market mechanism (i.e. the “discrete 
time” type of trading; the limited number of proposals per trader; the revelation of the agents’ 
proposals only at the end of each call) hinder the convergence process when some inside 
information is in the market. Anyway, according to our results, these characteristics also limit the 
																																								 																				
9 See Box 3 in appendix F. 
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occurrence of information mirages and then promote a greater level of efficiency during periods 
with no insider presence in the market. 
As far as traders’ profits are concerned, during periods where inside information was 
disseminated, we find that, in the double auction treatment, uninformed and informed traders’ 
profits were more similar with respect to the call market mechanism. This suggests that, in the 
double auction treatment, the speed and the quality of the dissemination process was greater than in 
the call market mechanism. As a consequence, most of the informational advantage of informed 
agents tended to disappear in the double auction, allowing uninformed traders to make profits that 
were not statistically lower than those realized by the insiders. This efficiency advantage of the 
double auction was found to be not statistically significant. 
In conclusion, our results show that the double auction mechanism performs better in the 
presence of insiders, and the call market institution should be preferred when no inside information 
is in the market. However, in real world financial markets, it is not easy to establish ex-ante if some 
inside information is fluctuating in the market. 
Nevertheless, some general guidelines could be derived from our research. First of all, in 
real world financial markets, there is a pre-opening phase in which the official opening price is 
determined. Typically, in the pre-opening sessions, information is still more heterogeneous and 
uncertain and there is no well-defined inside information fluctuating in the market. Then, during 
these phases, the probability of having agents engaging in insider trading behaviour is expected to 
be limited. However, in the remainder of the day’s trading session there might be agents who are 
more likely than others to access inside information and, consequently, to act as insiders. Therefore, 
according to our results, a call auction mechanism could be more appropriate in the pre-opening 
sessions because the probabilities of insider trading behaviour are limited and, as demonstrated, the 
call auction is likely to perform better in that context. The double auction institution could instead 
be adopted during the remainder of the trading day. Another factor that supports this implication, as 
we have seen, is that during periods with no inside information, the call market mechanism prices 
exhibited less variance with respect to the double auction mechanism. In the pre-opening sessions, 
because of the typical great level of information heterogeneity and uncertainty, negotiations are 
affected by immense volatility. For this reason, we think that a clearing mechanism in the pre-
opening sessions could also reduce the amount of volatility and act as a price stabilizer. This effect 
is supposed to be particularly prominent when it comes to setting an opening price. In the real 
world, some financial markets, like the New Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the 
London Stock Exchange, already rely on our suggested policy to use a call auction to determine the 
opening price and the double auction for the rest of the trading session. However, there are also 
some markets, like the Nasdaq, Hong Kong and Jakarta and Singapore’s markets, that adopt a 
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continuous double auction throughout the entire trading session. Still, there are some markets, like 
in Malaysia and Taiwan that use a call auction for the whole trading session. In this sense, our 
policy implication consists of suggesting a call auction in the pre-opening phase and then a 
continuous double auction in the remainder of the trading session. For the same reasons, in times of 
market stress, a temporary switch to a call market mechanism rather than a trading halt could also 
be a powerful solution to achieve stabilizing prices and reduce trading noise.  
28	
	
References 
Ackert, Lucy F., Bryan K. Church, and Ping Zhang. "Asset Prices and Information Traders’ 
Abilities: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets."Faculty Publications (2002). 
Alevy, Jonathan E., Michael S. Haigh, and John A. List. "Information cascades: Evidence from a 
field experiment with financial market professionals." The Journal of Finance 62.1 (2007): 
151-180. 
Alfarano, Simone, Iván Barreda-Tarrazona, and Eva Camacho-Cuena. "On the role of 
heterogeneous and imperfect information in a laboratory financial market." Central European 
Journal of Operations Research 14.4 (2006): 417-433. 
Alfarano, Simone, Eva Camacho, and Andrea Morone. The role of public and private information 
in a laboratory financial market. IVIE, 2011. 
Bachelier, Louis. Théorie de la spéculation. Gauthier-Villars, 1900. 
Beja, Avraham. The limited information efficiency of market processes. No. 43. University of 
California at Berkeley, 1976. 
Belovicz, Meyer W. "Sealed-bid auctions: Experimental results and applications." Research in 
experimental economics 1 (1979): 279-338. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V. "A simple model of herd behavior." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (1992): 797-817. 
Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. "A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and 
cultural change as informational cascades." Journal of political Economy (1992): 992-1026. 
Bikhchandani, Sushil, and Sunil Sharma. "Herd behavior in financial markets."IMF Staff 
papers (2000): 279-310. 
Brandouy, Olivier, Pascal Barneto, and Lawrence A. Leger. "Insider trading, imitative behaviour 
and price formulation in a stimulated double-auction stock market." (2000). 
Breaban, Adriana, and Charles N. Noussair. "Fundamental value trajectories and trader 
characteristics in an asset market experiment." (2014). 
Camerer, Colin, and Keith Weigelt. "Information mirages in experimental asset markets." Journal 
of Business (1991): 463-493. 
Cason, Timothy N., and Daniel Friedman. "Price formation in double auction markets." Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 20.8 (1996): 1307-1337. 
Cason, Timothy N., and Daniel Friedman. "Price formation in single call markets." Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society (1997): 311-345. 
Cason, Timothy, and Daniel Friedman. "Price formation and exchange in thin markets: A laboratory 
comparison of institutions." Money, Markets, and Method: Essays in Honour of Robert W. 
Clower (1999): 155-179. 
Chamberlin, Edward H. "An experimental imperfect market." The Journal of Political 
Economy (1948): 95-108. 
29	
	
Copeland, Thomas E., and Daniel Friedman. "The market value of information: Some experimental 
results." Journal of Business (1992): 241-266. 
Davis, Douglas D., and Arlington W. Williams. "The effects of rent asymmetries in posted offer 
markets." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 7.3 (1986): 303-316. 
Davis, Douglas D., Glenn W. Harrison, and Arlington W. Williams. "Convergence to nonstationary 
competitive equilibria: an experimental analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 22.3 (1993): 305-326. 
Dittrich, Dennis Alexis Valin, and Boris Maciejovsky. "Information dissemination on asset markets 
with endogenous and exogenous information: An experimental approach." Institute for 
Research into Economic Systems Papers on Strategic Interaction 3-2002 (2002). 
Dufwenberg, Martin, Tobias Lindqvist, and Evan Moore. "Bubbles and experience: An 
experiment." American Economic Review (2005): 1731-1737. 
Evans, Robert. "Sequential bargaining with correlated values." The Review of Economic 
Studies 56.4 (1989): 499-510. 
Fama, Eugene F. "The behavior of stock-market prices." Journal of business(1965): 34-105. 
Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work*." The journal of 
Finance 25.2 (1970): 383-417. 
Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: II." The journal of finance 46.5 (1991): 1575-1617. 
Fama, Eugene F. "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance." Journal of 
financial economics 49.3 (1998): 283-306. 
Ferri, Giovanni, and Andrea Morone. "The effect of rating agencies on herd behaviour." Journal of 
Economic Interaction and Coordination 9.1 (2014): 107-127. 
Fischbacher, Urs. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments." Experimental 
economics 10.2 (2007): 171-178. 
Fisher, Eric O’N., and Frank S. Kelly. "Experimental foreign exchange markets." Pacific Economic 
Review 5.3 (2000): 365-387. 
Forsythe, Robert, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Charles R. Plott. "Asset valuation in an experimental 
market." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society(1982): 537-567. 
Friedman, Daniel, and Shyam Sunder. Experimental methods: A primer for economists. Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. 
Friedman, Daniel. "How trading institutions affect financial market performance: Some laboratory 
evidence." Economic Inquiry 31.3 (1993): 410-435. 
Friedman, Daniel, and Joseph Ostroy. "Competitivity in auction markets: An experimental and 
theoretical investigation." The Economic Journal (1995): 22-53. 
Friedman, Daniel, and Joseph Ostroy. "Competitivity in auction markets: An experimental and 
theoretical investigation." The Economic Journal (1995): 22-53. 
30	
	
Grossman, Sanford. "On the efficiency of competitive stock markets where trades have diverse 
information." The Journal of finance 31.2 (1976): 573-585. 
Haruvy, Ernan, Yaron Lahav, and Charles N. Noussair. "Traders' expectations in asset markets: 
experimental evidence." The American Economic Review97.5 (2007): 1901-1920. 
Hey, John D., and Andrea Morone. "Do markets drive out lemmings—or vice 
versa?." Economica 71.284 (2004): 637-659. 
Huber, Jürgen, and Michael Kirchler. "The impact of instructions and procedure on reducing 
confusion and bubbles in experimental asset markets."Experimental Economics 15.1 (2012): 
89-105. 
Lei, Vivian, Charles N. Noussair, and Charles R. Plott. "Nonspeculative bubbles in experimental 
asset markets: Lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual 
irrationality." Econometrica (2001): 831-859. 
Lucas, Robert E. "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money." Journal of economic theory 4.2 
(1972): 103-124. 
Lux, Thomas, and Michele Marchesi. "Volatility clustering in financial markets: a microsimulation 
of interacting agents." International journal of theoretical and applied finance 3.04 (2000): 
675-702. 
Lux, Thomas, and Marcel Ausloos. "Market fluctuations I: Scaling, multiscaling, and their possible 
origins." The Science of Disasters. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002. 372-409. 
Kirchler, Erich, Boris Maciejovsky, and Martin Weber. Framing effects on asset markets: An 
experimental analysis. No. 2001, 17. Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 
373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, 2001. 
McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen Rassenti, and Vernon Smith. "Designing a uniform-price double 
auction: An experimental evaluation." The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and 
Evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust. Boston: Addison-Wesley 307 (1993): 32. 
Morone, Andrea. "Financial markets in the laboratory: an experimental analysis of some stylized 
facts." Quantitative Finance 8.5 (2008): 513-532. 
Plott, Charles R. "A computerized laboratory market system and research support systems for the 
multiple unit double auction." (1991). 
Smith, Vernon L., et al. "Competitive market institutions: Double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer 
auctions." The American Economic Review (1982): 58-77. 
Van Boening, Mark V., Arlington W. Williams, and Shawn LaMaster. "Price bubbles and crashes 
in experimental call markets." Economics Letters 41.2 (1993): 179-185. 
31	
	
 
APPENDIX A 
Instructions: double auction treatment 
Welcome to the experiment 
This is an experiment on decision making in financial markets. The experiment is straightforward 
and the instructions are easy to understand. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, 
you could earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Experiment Overview 
In this experiment you participate in a simple market. The market will take place over a sequence of 
13 trading periods. You may think of each trading period as a “business or trading day”. In this 
market a generic asset (“financial good”) is being traded and, at any moment during each trading 
period, you are free to buy or sell the asset. The money used in this experiment is “Experimental 
Currency Units” (ECU). Your cash payment at the end of the experiment will be in Euro. The 
conversion rate will be 200 ECU to 1 Euro. 
In this experiment you make money either by trading the asset or from the dividend on the asset. 
General Instructions 
The market consists of 9 participants and 13 trading periods. Each trading period will last 300 
seconds, during which you can trade the asset in exchange for experimental money. The first period 
is a trial period, useful to understand the trading mechanism. In the trial period no money will be 
paid for your earnings. The remaining 12 trading periods are “real” periods and they will count for 
your earnings. At the beginning of each trading period, you will be endowed with 200 ECU and 10 
units of the asset. At the end of each trading period, the asset will pay a dividend of either 10 or 20. 
At the beginning of each period, the dividend value will be randomly chosen by the experimenter 
and not revealed to the market participants. Then, with 50% chance the dividend will be 10 and 
with 50% chance the dividend will be 20. At the start of each trading period, with 50% chance, 
none of you will have information about the value of the dividend in that trading period and, with 
50% chance, only 5 of you out of 9 will be informed about the true dividend that the asset will pay 
at the end of that trading period. 
Buying and selling the asset 
At the beginning of each trading period, the screen will show you your initial amount of money, the 
number of units of asset in portfolio and a signal about your information on the dividend.  
You could receive one of the following two signals: 
1. “You have no information on the value of the dividend” 
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2. “The value of the dividend is “x” (with “x” = “10” or “20”) 
If you receive the signal “you have no information", it means that you do not have any information 
about the dividend the asset will pay at the end of that trading period. If this is the case, it may be 
either that you are in a trading period where nobody is informed about the dividend or that you are 
in a trading period where only 5 of you have information on the dividend and you are not among 
these five people. If you receive the signal “10” or “20”, it means that the true dividend is 10 or 20 
respectively. In this case, for sure you are in a trading period where only 5 of you have information 
on the dividend and you are among these five people. The identity of informed people will be 
randomly chosen by the computer in each trading period. 
How to use a computerized market 
As reported in Figure 1, on the top left of the screen you will see the trading period in which you are 
trading. On the top right of the screen you will see how much time is left in the current trading 
period. In the center of the screen you will see your amount of money, the number of assets you 
own and your signal. 
 
Figure 1: Buying and selling the asset 
 
33	
	
You can participate to the market in the following four ways: 
1. Making an offer to sell the asset, by entering the price at which you are willing to sell. 
To offer to sell a unit of the asset, enter the price at which you would like to sell in the box labeled 
“Your offer to sell” in the first column from the left of the screen, then click on the button “Offer to 
sell” on the bottom of the same column. 
The second column from right will show a list of offers to sell, each submitted by a different 
participant. The lowest offer to sell will be always placed on the bottom of the list. Your own offer 
will appear in blue. 
 
2. Making an offer to buy the asset, by entering the price at which you are willing to buy. 
To offer to buy a unit of the asset, enter the price at which you would like to buy in the box labeled 
“Your offer to buy” in the first column from the right of the screen, then click on the button “Offer 
to buy” on the bottom of the same column. The second column from left will show a list of offers to 
buy, each submitted by a different participant. The highest offer to buy will be always placed on the 
bottom of the list. Your own offer will appear in blue. 
 
3. Selling an asset by accepting an offer to buy. 
You can select an offer to buy from the second column from the left by clicking on it. If you click 
the “sell” button at the bottom of this column, you will sell one unit of the asset at the selected 
price. You are not allowed to sell a unit of the asset to yourself. When you accept an offer to buy, it 
will disappear from the list. If you also previously submitted an offer to sell, it will disappear from 
the offers to sell because you have just sold a unit of your asset. 
 
4. Buying an asset by accepting an offer to sell. 
You can select an offer to sell from the second column from the right by clicking on it. If you click 
the “buy” button at the bottom of this column, you will purchase one unit of the asset at the selected 
price. You are not allowed to buy a unit of the asset from yourself. When you accept an offer to sell, 
it will disappear from the list. If you also previously submitted an offer to buy, it will disappear 
from the offers to buy because you have just bought a unit of your asset. 
You can only buy/sell one unit of the asset at a time. You can buy/sell several times in each trading 
period. When you buy an asset, the amount of your money will decrease by the price of purchase. 
You can only buy an asset if you have enough money to pay for it. When you sell an asset, the 
amount of your money will increase by the price of the sale. You can sell units of asset as long as 
you own them in portfolio. In the middle column of the screen, labeled “Transaction Prices”, you 
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will see the prices at which the units of the asset have been traded in the current trading period. Any 
time you accept an offer to sell or buy, a new contract has been closed and the selected price will 
appear in the column “Transactions Prices”. 
Your Earnings 
As reported in figure 2, at the end of each trading period your profit will be equal to your “Money 
before payment of dividends” minus “Initial Money” plus “Your total dividend”. 
At the end of the experiment, your final earnings will be equal to the sum of your profits in each of 
the twelve “real” trading periods (the trial period does not count). 
 
Figure 2: Your earnings	
The following scheme shows the composition of your earnings for each period: 
Initial Money (200 ECU)  – 
(Nr. of assets you bought x market price) + = Money before payment of dividends 
(Nr. of assets you sold x market price)  
 
- 
Initial Money (200 ECU)	
 
+	
Dividend of the period x 
   = Your total dividend	
Nr. of assets at the end of the period 
 
 =  
        Your earnings at the end of the period 
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions: call market treatment 
Welcome to the experiment 
This is an experiment on decision making in financial markets. The experiment is straightforward 
and the instructions are easy to understand. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, 
you could earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Experiment Overview 
In this experiment you participate in a simple market. The market will take place over a sequence of 
13 trading periods. You may think of each trading period as a “business or trading day”. In this 
market a generic asset (“financial good”) is being traded and you are free to buy or sell the asset. 
The money used in this experiment is “Experimental Currency Units” (ECU). Your cash payment at 
the end of the experiment will be in Euro. The conversion rate will be 300 ECU to 1€  
In this experiment you make money either by trading the asset or from the dividend on the asset. 
General Instructions 
The market consists of 9 participants and 13 trading periods, of which 1 trial period (period 0) and 
12 real periods. In the trial period (period 0) you will not be paid for your earnings. Only the real 
periods will account for your earnings. At the beginning of each period you will be endowed with 
200 ECU and 10 units of asset. At the end of each trading period, the asset will pay a dividend of 
either 10 or 20. At the beginning of each period, the dividend value will be randomly chosen by the 
experimenter and not revealed to the market participants. Then, with 50% chance the dividend will 
be 10 and with 50% chance the dividend will be 20. At the start of each trading period, with 50% 
chance, none of you will have information about the value of the dividend in that trading period 
and, with 50% chance, only 5 of you out of 9 will be informed about the true dividend that the asset 
will pay at the end of that trading period. Each trading period is divided in 4 sub-periods. Each sub-
period will last 60 seconds, during which you can trade the asset in exchange for experimental 
money. The value of the dividend drawn at the beginning of each period will remain the same for 
all the 4 sub-periods of each period. 
Buying and selling the asset 
At the beginning of each trading period, the screen will show you your initial amount of money, the 
number of assets in portfolio and a signal about your information on the dividend.  
You could receive one of the following two signals: 
1. “You have no information on the value of the dividend” 
2. “The value of the dividend is “x” (with “x” = “10” or “20”) 
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The signal you receive will not change in the 4 sub-periods of each trading period. 
If you receive the signal “you have no information", it means that you do not have any information 
about the dividend the asset will pay at the end of that trading period. If this is the case, it may be 
either that you are in a trading period where nobody is informed about the dividend or that you are 
in a trading period where only 5 of you have information on the dividend and you are not among 
these five people. If you receive the signal “10” or “20”, it means that the true dividend is 10 or 20 
respectively. In this case, for sure you are in a trading period where only 5 of you have information 
on the dividend and you are among these five people. The identity of informed people will be 
randomly chosen by the computer in each trading period. 
How to use a computerized market 
As reported in Figure 1, on the top left of the screen you will see the trading period and the sub-
period in which you are trading. On the top right of the screen you will see how much time is left in 
the current trading period. In the left part of the screen you will see your amount of money, the 
number of assets you own and your signal. In the right part of the screen you will be showed the set 
of possible actions you can perform. 
 
 
Figure 1: Buying and selling the asset 
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In particular, in each sub-period of any trading period, you can make the following three decisions: 
i. Selling the asset 
ii. Buying the asset 
iii. I do not want to trade 
If you decide to sell or buy the asset, the next screen you will be asked for the price at which you 
would like to sell or buy the asset and for the number of units of asset you would like to sell or buy. 
For example, if you decide to sell shares, you will move to the following screen (Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2: I would like to be a seller	
 
In addition to the general parameters described above (period, money, number of units of asset and 
time left), this screen will show, in the second line up on the left of the screen, your position of 
"Seller". In the central part of the screen, you are asked to enter the selling price and the number of 
units of asset you would like to sell at that price. The same procedure will be followed if you decide 
to buy. In this case, the screen will show, in the second line up on the left of the screen, your 
position of "Buyer". In the main part of the screen, you are asked to enter the purchase price and the 
number of units of asset you would like to buy at that price. Finally, if you decide for the option "I 
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do not want to trade", you will not take part in trading. Therefore your amount of money and the 
number of shares you own will not change. 
In this market, your sale and purchase orders only represent a proposal and there is no guarantee 
that your order will be executed. The execution of orders depends on the following. 
At the end of each sub-period, purchase prices will be ordered from the highest to the lowest, thus 
the demand function will be drawn. Sale prices will instead be ordered from the lowest to the 
highest, thus the supply function will be drawn. In each sub-period, the intersection point of the 
supply and demand functions will represent the equilibrium price. 
The equilibrium price is the price at which the purchase and sale orders previously submitted by 
you and the other participants will be executed. However, only purchase orders at a price equal or 
higher than the equilibrium price will be executed and only the sale orders at a price equal or lower 
than the equilibrium price will be executed. Following the determination of the equilibrium price, 
only if your sale order will be executed (that is, if you had proposed a sale price equal or lower than 
the equilibrium price), the number of units of asset held by you will decrease by the number of units 
that you had offered to sell and the money at your disposal will increase by an amount equal to the 
number of units sold multiplied by the sales price (i.e the equilibrium price) of each unit. Following 
the determination of the equilibrium price, only if your purchase order will be executed (that is, if 
you had offered a purchase price equal or higher than the equilibrium price), the number of shares 
held by you will increase by the number of shares that you had proposed to buy and the money at 
your disposal will decrease by an amount equal to the number of units purchased multiplied by the 
purchase price (i.e the equilibrium price) of each unit. 
Your Earnings 
At the end of each sub-period you will receive an update on your activity in the sub-period. The 
update will include the number of shares and cash at the beginning of the sub-period, your order to 
buy or sell with its price (if you decided to submit an order), the number of units you purchased or 
sold with its execution price (if your order was executed), the residual number of units of asset and 
the remaining money. In addition to such information, as shown in Figure 3, only in the last sub-
period of each period (i.e at the end of each period), you will be revealed the value of the dividend, 
your earnings from dividend (Total Dividend) and the total profit of the period. 
Your profit at the end of the experiment will be equal to the sum of the profits made in the 12 real 
periods (the trial period does not count for your earnings). 
39	
	
 
Figure 3: Your earnings 
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APPENDIX C 
No insider periods that, even satisfying our information mirage conditions, have not been 
considered as a mirage because the trading activity does not resemble the typical convergence 
pattern observed in inside periods. 
  
  
	
APPENDIX D  
Information mirages 
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APPENDIX E 
Trading activity in periods with inside information 
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Appendix F 
Box 1 
Generally speaking, the two samples Kolmogrov-Smirov test is used to state whether or not two 
sample distributions are likely to come from the same population. In particular, in the first line, we 
test the null hypothesis that the double auction MSE distribution is lower than the call market MSE 
distribution. In the second line we test the null hypothesis that the call market MSE distribution is 
lower than the double auction MSE distribution. From the test we reject the hypothesis that the two 
distributions come from the same population and we accept the hypothesis that the call market 
MSE distribution contains smaller values than the double auction MSE distribution. The latter 
hypothesis is accepted with a p-value of 0.4. 
 
Table 1: two-sample kolmogrov-Smirov test for the DA and CM MSE distribution in no insider periods 
 
Box 2 
In each period of both the DA and CM treatment, we measure the percentage of shares held by 
uninformed traders. Using these data, we perform a two-sample mean comparison test to assess in 
which treatment the security holding was more equally split between uninformed and informed 
traders. If in a given period insiders were able to buy as much they liked, it means that the 
information was not well disseminated and that someone of the uninformed traders did not 
understand that it would have been very profitable acting as net buyer. Results from the two-
sample comparison test are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: two-sample mean comparison test for security holdings in the DA and CM treatment. Only insider periods 
with the good state (20) are taken into consideration. 
Variable A represents the distribution of the percentage of shares held by uninformed traders in the 
call market treatment. Variable B stands for the distribution of the percentage of shares held by 
uninformed traders in the double auction treatment. We only consider the insider periods in which 
the good state occurred and in which prices exhibited convergence toward the realized state price. 
In other words, we consider those insider periods where the information was disseminated. 
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Box 3 
To test whether this result is significant, we performed the K-sample equality of median test, 
reported in figure 10.  
 
Table 3: k-sample median comparison test for the percentage ratio of the average realized profit per insider to 
theaverage realized profit per uninformed trader in the DA and CM treatment 
This test is typically useful to state whether k sample distributions come from populations with the 
same median. In our case, k is equal to 2. The first distribution of the test contains the double 
auction insider premium, while the second distribution contains the call market insider premium. 
As we can see from the test, in the double auction treatment, 10 observations out of 18 are lower 
than the overall median (i.e. the median computed by merging the two distributions), while in the 
call market 2 observations out of 6 are below the overall median. Nevertheless, the test does not 
lead to a statistically significant result.  
 
 
 
 
